We can describe Apple’s strategy in terms of product differentiation [Pt 1] and strategic alliances [Pt 2].
Pt 2: Strategic Alliances.
Apple has a history of shunning strategic alliances. On June 25, 1985, Bill Gates sent a memo to John Sculley (then-CEO of Apple) and Jean-Louis Gassée (then-Products President). Gates recommended that Apple license Macintosh technology to 3-5 significant manufacturers, listing companies and contacts such as AT&T, DEC, Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, Xerox, and Motorola. (Linzmayer, 245-8) After not receiving a response, Gates wrote another memo on July 29, naming three other companies and stating, “I want to help in any way I can with the licensing. Please give me a call.”
In 1987, Sculley refused to sign licensing contracts with Apollo Computer. He felt that up-and-coming rival Sun Microsystems would overtake Apollo Computer, which did happen. Then, Sculley and Michael Spindler (COO) partnered Apple with IBM and Motorola on the PowerPC chip. Sculley and Spindler were hoping IBM would buy Apple and put them in charge of the PC business. That never came to fruition, because Apple (with Spindler as the CEO) seemed contradictory and was extraordinarily difficult in business dealings. Apple turned the corner in 1993. Spindler begrudgingly licensed the Mac to Power Computing in 1993 and to Radius (who made Mac monitors) in 1995. However, Spindler nixed Gateway in 1995 due to cannibalization fears. Gil Amelio, an avid supporter of licensing, took over as CEO in 1996. Under Amelio, Apple licensed to Motorola and IBM.
In 1996, Apple announced the $427 million purchase of NeXT Software, marking the return of Steve Jobs. Amelio suddenly resigned in 1997, and the stage was set for Jobs to resume power. Jobs despised licensing, calling cloners “leeches”. He pulled the plug, essentially killing its largest licensee (Power Computing). Apple subsequently acquired Power Computing’s customer database, Mac OS license, and key employees for $100 million of Apple stock and $10 million to cover debt and closing costs. The business was worth $400 million. A massive reversal occurred in 1997 and 1998. In 1997, Jobs overhauled the board of directors and then entered Apple into patent cross-licensing and technology agreements with Microsoft.
In 1998, Jobs stated that Apple’s strategy is to “focus all of our software development resources on extending the Macintosh operating system. To realize our ambitious plans we must focus all of our efforts in one direction.”
This statement was in the wake of Apple divesting significant software holdings (Claris/FileMaker and Newton). There is economic value in strategic alliances. In the case of Apple, there was the opportunity to manage risk and share costs facilitate tacit collusion , and manage uncertainty. It would have been applicable to the industries in which Apple operated. Tacit collusion is a valid source of economic value in network industries, which the computer industry is. Managing uncertainty, managing risk, and sharing costs are sources of economic value in any industry.
Although Apple eventually realized the economic value of strategic alliances, it should have occurred earlier. The following are some comments about Apple’s no-licensing policy. “If Apple had licensed the Mac OS when it first came out, Window wouldn’t exist today.” – Jon van Bronkhorst, “The computer was never the problem. The company’s strategy was. Apple saw itself as a hardware company; in order to protect our hardware profits, we didn’t license our operating system. We had the most beautiful operating system, but to get it you had to buy our hardware at twice the price. That was a mistake.
What we should have done was calculate an appropriate price to license the operating system. We were also naïve to think that the best technology would prevail. It often doesn’t.” – Steve Wozniak, Apple cofounder “If we had licensed earlier, we would be the Microsoft of today.” – Ian W. Diery, Apple Executive VP, I am aware that I am known as the Great Satan on licensing…I was never for or against licensing. I just did not see how it would make sense. But my approach was stupid. We were just fat cats living off a business that had no competition.” – Jean-Louis Gassée, Be CEO and ex-CEO of Apple, admitting he made a strategic mistake.
A strategic alliance can be a sustained competitive advantage if it is rare, difficult to imitate, and the company has an organization to exploit it. If the number of competing firms implementing a similar strategic alliance is relatively few, the strategy is rare. If there are socially complex relations among partners and there is no direct duplication, the strategy is difficult to imitate. When organizing for strategic alliances, a firm must consider whether the alliance is non-equity or equity. A non-equity alliance should have explicit contracts and legal sanctions. An equity alliance should have contracts describing the equity investment. There are some substitutes for an equity alliance, such as internal development and acquisitions. However, the difficulties with these drive the formation of strategic alliances.
It is vital to remember, “Commitment, coordination, and trust are all important determinants of alliance success.”
MWS believes in strategic alliances and is licensing our products and services to organizations and entrepreneurs. We are represented by the MWS Country Representatives across the globe. Find out more about our Country Representatives by visiting http://www.miniworkshopseries.com now.